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 Social motivation theory attempts to explain Autism Spectrum Disorder (ASD) 
symptomatology by suggesting that deficits in social motivation have downstream effects on 
children’s socio-cognitive abilities, such as theory of mind (ToM; Chevallier, Kohls, Troiani, 
Brodkin, & Schultz, 2012). This theory posits that children with ASD would show social 
motivation deficits, such as a lack of social preference, and would show deficits in ToM, such as 
failing an implicit false belief task. An objective to the present study was to examine the 
association between tasks measuring social motivation and ToM abilities in typically developing 
(TD) children and children with ASD. ToM is an example of naïve psychology, a category of 
domain-specific core understandings. Another objective of this study was to extend work on the 
dissociation across naïve theories by exploring children’s performance on naïve psychology, as 
well as naïve physics, and naïve biology. A biological motion and a static face preference task 
were administered on a split screen to measure social motivation. An implicit false belief task 
was administered to measure ToM (naïve psychology), a story sequencing task was used to 
measure naïve physics, and an understanding of “insides” was assessed to measure naïve 
biology. Tasks measuring social motivation were related to each other when assessed in TD 
children only. TD children but not children with ASD showed a social preference. Furthermore, 
children with ASD failed the implicit false belief task but not the naïve physics or naïve biology 
tasks. The present study replicates and extends previous findings, as well as strengthens the 
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Autism Spectrum Disorder (ASD) is a neurodevelopmental disorder with observable 
behaviour characterized by deficits in social communication and social interaction evident in 
multiple contexts, as well as restricted repetitive patterns of behaviour, interests, or activities 
(American Psychiatric Association, 2013). Since its identification by Leo Kanner in 1943, an 
extensive body of research has been generated from theories that could potentially explain ASD. 
A seminal study conducted by Baron-Cohen, Leslie, and Frith (1985) launched a cascade of 
research on the role of theory of mind (ToM) in children with ASD. In his mindblindness theory, 
Baron-Cohen (1995) proposed that said social and communicative symptoms might be due to 
specific deficits in ToM. ToM is defined as the understanding that others have mental states, 
such as intentions, beliefs, and desires, which may differ from one’s own (Baron-Cohen et al., 
1985; Leslie, 1987; Premack & Woodruff, 1978). There are various constructs subsumed under 
the concept of a ToM – diverse desires (e.g., two people can have different desires), diverse 
beliefs (e.g., two people can have different beliefs about an object), knowledge access (e.g., 
someone may have knowledge about a situation), false belief (e.g., someone is mistaken about 
the location of an object), and hidden emotions (e.g., someone may not display the emotions they 
are feeling at the moment) to name a few (Wellman & Liu, 2004; Wellman & Peterson, 2013). 
The most frequently used test for ToM is that of false belief, where the individual views a 
protagonist whose possession (e.g. a marble) is moved to a different location without his/her 
knowledge. In the traditional explicit false belief task, the individual is asked where the 
protagonist will look for the marble. In order to pass the false belief test, the individual must 
answer that the protagonist will search where he/she last saw the marble; thus attributing a false 
belief to the protagonist given that he/she was unaware that the marble had changed location.  
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Children typically pass false belief by the age of four (Frith, 2012; Wellman, Cross, & 
Watson, 2001). However, children with ASD continuously fail this task. For example, Baron-
Cohen and colleagues (1985) tested 20 children diagnosed with ASD using the Sally-Anne test, a 
classic change-of-location ToM task. In this study, the children saw Anne move Sally’s marble 
while Sally was not looking. When Sally returned, the children were asked to point where Sally 
would look for her marble. The researchers found that 80% of their participants (aged six to 
sixteen) with ASD failed the ToM task. The authors proposed that children with ASD failed to 
recognize that the protagonist had a false belief about the situation (Baron-Cohen, Leslie, & 
Frith, 1986). In fact, children with ASD only start to pass explicit measures of ToM between 
ages nine and eleven (Frith, 2012; Happé, 1995). Furthermore, they tend to pass the hidden 
emotion task earlier, which is typically harder than the false belief task (Peterson, Wellman, & 
Slaughter, 2012; Slaughter, 2015). It has been suggested that children with ASD fail the false 
belief task because it requires advanced pragmatic skills (Senju, 2012). For example, when asked 
“where will he/she look for the marble”, children may pre-emptively process the “where” and 
look where the marble is actually located, thus failing the explicit false belief task (Csibra & 
Southgate, 2006). Moreover, the explicit false belief task involves several executive functions, 
such as working memory to remember the story sequence, and inhibitory control to prevent 
oneself from pointing to the correct location of the marble (Kimhi, 2014). For this reason, ASD 
researchers started using implicit versions of the false belief task, wherein children were not 
required to explicitly state (or point to) the correct answer (Senju, 2012). Such implicit false 
belief tasks were originally designed to test younger, nonverbal infants and were therefore 
thought to be useful in ASD research (Clements & Perner, 1994; Senju, 2012).  
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Accumulated results from infant research has shown that ToM is present in children 
much younger than four years of age when it is studied implicitly using anticipatory looking 
procedures (Clements & Perner, 1994; Poulin-Dubois, Brooker, & Chow, 2009; Southgate, 
Senju, & Csibra, 2007). For example, in a recent study, 18-month-olds were shown a classic 
change-of-location false belief video and their looking behaviour was captured using eye-
tracking technology (Thoermer, Sodian, Vuori, Perst, & Kristen, 2012). In this video, a 
protagonist viewed a car move from one garage to the next, but when the protagonist was 
distracted, the car left the scene. The researchers calculated the ratio of duration of looking to the 
correct door to total duration of looking to both doors (differential looking score; DLS), where a 
score above 0.50 indicated a correct anticipatory response. A total of 55% of the 18-month-olds 
correctly anticipated where the protagonist would look for the car, suggesting that this task 
provides a conservative measure of implicit false belief. Since participants’ looking behaviour is 
used as evidence of where they expect the protagonist to go, no explicit responses such as 
pointing or verbal answers are required. This paradigm addressed the pragmatic and some of the 
executive function issues raised from explicit false belief paradigms. Consequently, implicit false 
belief measures have been used in recent studies involving children with ASD. For instance, 
Senju and colleagues (2010) used eye-tracking technology to measure anticipatory looking in 
children with ASD aged six to eight years. These children had been previously diagnosed, by a 
child psychiatrist or pediatrician, with autistic disorder, Asperger disorder, pervasive 
developmental disorder – not otherwise specified, or pervasive developmental disorder without a 
detailed diagnosis. The children with ASD viewed a change of location task similar to the Sally-
Anne task and DLS was used to measure whether children looked longer at the correct door than 
the incorrect door. The researchers found that children with ASD failed the implicit false belief 
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task while the typically developing (TD) children correctly anticipated where the protagonist 
would look (Senju et al., 2010). In another study, children with ASD also failed to anticipate the 
correct location of the protagonist; correct anticipation was defined as looking longer at the 
correct location (Ruffman, Garnham, & Rideout, 2001). Thus, children with ASD’s poor 
performance on false belief tasks cannot be fully explained by pragmatic or executive function 
demands.  
There are several theories relating ToM deficits to ASD symptomatology. A prominent 
theory brought forward by Baron-Cohen and colleagues (1985; 1995) posits that children’s social 
and communicative impairments can be explained by this ToM deficit. Throughout the years, 
several researchers have endorsed this theory (Loth, Gomez, & Happé, 2008; Senju, 2012). This 
view argues that since individuals with ASD have difficulty understanding another person’s 
perspective, they cannot communicate effectively with others; ToM has downstream effects on 
social abilities (Kimhi, 2014). Likewise, children who are skilled at mindreading can 
communicate effectively with their peers (Slaughter, 2015). Not only is ToM a reliable measure 
of socio-cognitive abilities, it is also viewed as a representation of naïve psychology. Naïve 
psychology, defined as understanding that individuals’ behaviours are associated to their mental 
states, is a concept stemming from naïve theories (Poulin-Dubois, Brooker, & Chow, 2009; 
Wellman & Peterson, 2013). Naïve theories are qualified as domain-specific core understandings 
that are central to children’s cognitive development (Peterson & Siegal, 1997; Wellman & 
Gelman, 1992).  
There are several domains, besides  naïve psychology, that are under the umbrella of 
naïve theories (Peterson & Siegal, 1997). One such domain is that of naïve physics, defined as 
the understanding of mechanical functions and of physical properties (Baron-Cohen et al., 1986; 
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Peterson & Siegal, 1997). Baron-Cohen and colleagues (1986) studied naïve psychology, using 
picture sequencing of intentional understanding (e.g., girl puts teddy down and turns to pick a 
flower, boy takes the teddy, girl returns to see the teddy is gone), and naïve physics, using 
picture sequencing of physical properties (e.g., a balloon flies towards a tree and bursts on a 
branch). In this study, children were awarded two points if they correctly sequenced the stories 
and, one point if only the ending was correct. Three trials were administered for each condition 
for a possible total score of six. They found that children with ASD performed significantly 
worse than TD children on the naïve psychology task but performed significantly better than TD 
children on the naïve physics task. Children with ASD scored on average 1.76 out of 6 on the 
naïve psychology task. This led Baron-Cohen and his colleagues (1986) to propose that children 
with ASD have a specific deficit in naïve psychology (i.e. ToM) and that their naïve physics 
abilities are intact. With regard to naïve biology, to our knowledge, only one study has examined 
this form of knowledge in an ASD population. Peterson and Siegal (1997) found that children 
with ASD do not differ from TD children in their understanding of growth. However, naïve 
biology has been extensively examined in TD children (Inagaki & Hatano, 2006). For example, 
Gottfried and Gelman (2005) studied the understanding of biological “insides” in 3- to 5-year-
olds. In this study, the 4- and 5-year-olds were able to accurately attribute animal “insides” to 
animals (e.g., the brain matched to the tapir) and mechanical “insides” to machines (e.g., the 
batteries matched to the intercom) yet the 3-year-olds failed the task (Gottfried and Gelman, 
2005). Given that this study provided insight on the development of naïve biology in TD 
children, one goal of the current study was to study this concept in children with ASD. 
A different theory that explains  how the symptomatology of individuals with ASD 
develops is that of social motivation theory. This theory posits that children with ASD have early 
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social motivation deficits, which prevent them from attending to and learning from social 
information in their environment, thus begetting socio-cognitive (i.e. ToM) deficits (Broekhof et 
al., 2015; Chevallier, Kohls, Troiani, Brodkin, & Schultz, 2012; Senju & Johnson, 2009). This 
general theory is not specific to ASD diagnoses – the authors argue that levels of social 
motivation should be related to ToM abilities across all populations (Chevallier et al., 2012). 
Thus one of the goals of the present study was to assess the relation between social motivation 
and ToM abilities in both TD children and children with ASD.  
There are three ways to measure social motivation: social orienting, social reward, and 
social maintaining (Chevallier et al., 2012). Social orienting can be assessed using preferential 
looking techniques, where a social element and a non-social element are presented on a split 
screen. The participants’ looking behaviour is recorded in order to determine whether they have 
a preference for one of the stimuli. For example, researchers have shown a split screen showing 
human biological motion and phase-scrambled motion to children with ASD aged three to seven 
years (Annaz, Campbell, Coleman, Milne, & Swettenham, 2012). These researchers found that 
TD children looked (measured in percentage of looking time) longer to the human biological 
motion, thus showing a preference for the social stimulus. In contrast, the children with ASD in 
this study did not look longer to the social stimulus, showing a lack of social motivation (Annaz, 
et al., 2012). In fact, children with ASD have often been shown in the literature to have a lack of 
preference for biological motion (Flack-Ytter, Rehnberg, & Bölte, 2013; Klin & Jones, 2008). 
However, there are discrepant findings in the literature; recent results indicated that both children 
with ASD and TD children perform similarly on a biological motion (i.e. a walking human) task, 
assessed using proportion of looking time to biological motion and non-biological motion (i.e. a 
truck; Wright, Kelley, & Poulin-Dubois, 2014). In another study by the same authors, both 
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groups did not differ on visual exploration (number of saccades) between biological motion and 
non-biological motion (Wright, Kelley, & Poulin-Dubois, 2016). Furthermore, even TD 
children’s performance on this biological motion task varies across studies, such as 
demonstrating a non-social preference in some studies (Wright, Kelley, & Poulin-Dubois, 2016). 
This discrepancy across the literature stresses the need to use more than one measure of social 
orienting since children’s (both TD and with ASD) performance varies across studies.  
Other researchers tackled the issue using eye-tracking technology to record visual 
exploration of social and non-social stimuli rather than using a preferential looking paradigm 
(Sasson, Turner-Brown, Holtzclaw, Lam, & Bodfish, 2008). These researchers used two types of 
non-social stimuli: high-autism interest (HAI) objects and low-autism interest (LAI). HAI 
objects were defined as being part of circumscribed interests for individuals with ASD (e.g., 
trains), whereas LAI objects were defined as not being part of this circumscribed category (e.g., 
clothing).  In this study, the participants viewed arrays comprised of social images paired with 
either HAI or LAI objects, for a total of six social and object arrays. The researchers measured 
the number of different images explored in an array using eye-tracking data on the number of 
fixations to defined areas of interest in the arrays. Children with ASD aged 6 to 17 years looked 
less at the social stimuli if it was paired with an HAI object (Sasson et al., 2008). These results 
were replicated in a later study with 2- to 5-year-olds (Sasson, Elison, Turner-Brown, Dichter, & 
Bodfish, 2011). Together, these findings demonstrate that children with ASD do not show social 
motivation (i.e. they do not orient more towards social stimuli). However, these researchers did 
not use total or proportion of gaze duration to the stimuli; they used number of stimuli viewed. It 
is difficult to draw conclusions since participants can look at more (frequency) non-social objects 
but for a short duration, and vice versa. This is why Sasson and colleagues (2008; 2011) describe 
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their variable as a measure of visual exploration rather than social preference. There is little 
research aimed at exploring the relationship between this lack of social motivation and ToM 
deficits. To our knowledge, the only other study examining both ToM and social motivation in 
children with ASD was conducted by Chevallier and colleagues (2014). These researchers 
investigated the audience effect in children with and without ASD when completing a ToM task; 
this audience effect was measured by having the experimenter either present or absent during the 
administration of the task. The authors found that TD children performed better on the ToM task 
when it was administered by the experimenter (vs. by a computer), whereas children with ASD’s 
performance did not differ. The authors argued that this indicated that TD children showed a 
social motivation but not the children with ASD. The children in this study were on average 10-
years-old, social motivation was not assessed by measuring social orienting, and the ToM task 
was explicit in nature. Therefore, the present study is the first to examine the link between social 
orienting and an implicit false belief task in children with ASD aged 3 to 6 years.  Another goal 
of the current study was to use more than one measure of social motivation and to examine the 
relation between children’s performance on said social motivation tasks. To achieve this goal, 
both a biological motion and static face task were used.  
In summary, the objectives of the present study were to 1) explore the relations between 
social motivation tasks, 2) examine the association between tasks measuring social motivation 
(i.e. social orienting) and ToM abilities (implicit false belief) and 3) extend work on the 
dissociation across naïve theories by exploring children’s performance on naïve psychology, 
naïve physics, and naïve biology. The ToM task used was adapted from Thoermer and 
colleagues’ (2012) change-of-location implicit false belief task, which served as the socio-
cognitive measure for the second objective and as the naïve psychology measure for the third 
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objective. Two experiments were conducted, where the first experiment addressed the above 
three objectives in TD children in order to better understand the relation between the tasks. The 
second experiment addressed the same objectives in both TD children and children with ASD. 
Social motivation was assessed using two types of stimuli: a biological motion measure adapted 
from Annaz and colleagues (2012), and a static face measure adapted from Sasson, Dichter, and 
Bodfish (2012). The static face measure encompassed two types of non-social stimuli: HAI 
objects and LAI objects (Sasson et al., 2012). The naïve physics measure consisted of story-
sequencing task involving physics properties (adapted from Baron-Cohen et al., 1986). The naïve 
biology measure consisted of a matching task involving animal and machine “insides” (adapted 
from Gottfried & Gelman, 2005).  
Experiment 1 
As per the social motivation theory, we examined whether TD children’s performance on 
two social motivation tasks would be associated with their performance on the ToM task. 
Furthermore, it was hypothesized that TD children’s performance on the individual social 
motivation tasks would be positively associated with each other, indicating that both tasks 
reliably measure social motivation. TD children were expected to pass the implicit false belief 
task and they were expected to show a preference for the social stimuli in the social motivation 
tasks. It was hypothesized that their performance on the naïve psychology, naïve physics, and 
naïve biology tasks would be equivalent. However, we also expected developmental changes in 
children’s performance on these three tasks.  
Method 
Participants. Forty children aged 2 to 7 years (25 boys and 15 girls; mean age = 4.23 
years, range = 2.08–7.50), who were recruited from a laboratory database, participated in this 
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study; thirty-six spoke English, and four spoke French. Of these, fourteen participants were 
excluded in the analyses because the task was not recorded for the biological motion task (n = 3), 
static face (n = 7), or the ToM task (n = 4). 
Materials. The biological motion, static face, and ToM tasks were administered on a 23 
inch monitor. The training condition of the naïve physics task consisted of four stories not 
involving physics concepts: 1) a girl eating a banana, 2) a boy going fishing, 3) a boy playing 
with blocks, and 4) a girl playing on a slide. The test condition of the naïve physics task 
included: 1) a man kicking a rock, 2) a balloon flying into a tree, 3) an egg falling off a table, and 
4) tumbling rocks. Each of these stories were  depicted on three 9 cm X 8 cm laminated cards 
with Velcro on the back of each card so they could be placed on the storyboard. The naïve 
biology task consisted of target images on 21.59 cm X 27.94 cm laminated cards and “inside” 
images on 7.5 cm X 5 cm laminated cards. A white 7.5 cm X 5 cm rectangle and Velcro was 
placed on the center of each target image on which an “inside” card can be placed. The training 
condition consisted of two target images of familiar furniture (refrigerator and dresser). The 
“insides” of the training condition consisted of familiar food (an apple, milk, and a sandwich) 
and familiar clothing (dress, sweater, and jeans). The target images of the test condition 
consisted of four unfamiliar animals (eland, pacarana, tapir, and cavy) and four unfamiliar 
machines (electric razor, intercom, mini TV, and espresso maker). The test condition consisted 
of four animal “insides” (lungs, bones, muscle, and heart), and four mechanical “insides” (gears, 
wire, battery, and circuit board). 
Procedure. Each child participated in two visits in our laboratory. During the first visit, 
the participants’ parents were explained the study in detail and asked to sign the consent form. 
The parents completed a demographic questionnaire and the current version of the Social 
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Communication Questionnaire (SCQ; Rutter, Bailey, & Lord, 2003). The SCQ is a 40-item 
standardized questionnaire that was developed to screen for symptoms and behaviours associated 
with ASD. Each participant completed a total of seven tasks: two social motivation tasks (static 
face and biological motion), one socio-cognitive task (implicit false belief), two naïve theory 
tasks (naïve physics and naïve biology) and two cognitive measures (Differential Ability Scale 
and the Peabody Picture Vocabulary Test, see Table 1). The order of the tasks was 
counterbalanced across each visit. The video tasks were administered in one block and the 
interactive tasks were administered in a separate block in order to avoid breaking the 
participants’ concentration. The order of the tasks within these blocks was counterbalanced and 
the order in which the blocks were presented was randomized. To code their looking time during 
the video tasks participants were filmed using a webcam. 
Table 1 






(age equivalent in years) 
PPVT-VMA  
(age equivalent in years) SCQ Scores 
Mean 4.23 4.58 4.89 4.36 
SD  1.26 1.33 1.55 3.21 
Range 2.08–7.50 2.58–7.58 1.83–7.42 0–11 
 
Biological motion. This task was adapted from Annaz and colleagues (2012). Point-light 
displays of a walking human and of a phase-scrambled walking human were presented on a split 
screen. Eight trials were presented for 6 seconds each. Each display consisted of 13 point-light 
dots, which were placed on major parts of the human (e.g. one head, two shoulders, two elbows, 
two hands, two hips, two knees, and two feet). The phase-scrambled display was created by 
making the motion trajectories play temporally out of phase. Half of the trials were shown to be 
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moving towards the right. The side on which the human was presented and the order of each 
video (right/left walking) were counterbalanced. A central fixation cross accompanied by a ring 
sound was presented prior to each trial in order to orient children’s attention to the screen.  
 
Figure 1. A still screen of the biological motion stimuli with the human walking on the left and 
the scrambled motion on the right.  
Static face. This task was adapted from Sasson and colleagues (2012). Pictures of 
humans and objects were presented on a split screen. Twenty trials were presented for 5 seconds 
each. The 20 pictures of humans consisted of 10 males and 10 females, ranging in age (babies to 
elderly people ) and ethnicity. The 20 pictures of objects consisted of 10 HAI objects (two 
vehicles, two signs, two sets of blocks, two electronics, and two clocks) and 10 LAI objects (two 
pieces of clothing, two instruments, two plants, two tools, and two pieces of furniture). The side 
on which the human was presented and the order of male/female human and HAI/LAI object 
were counterbalanced. A central fixation cross accompanied by a ring sound was presented prior 




Figure 2. An example of the social/non-social pairs in the static face task, with a HAI object on 
the left and a human face on the right.  
Theory of mind. This task was adapted from Thoermer and colleagues (2012). Three 
short videos were shown in succession: two familiarization videos (26 seconds each) and a test 
video (35 seconds). The familiarization videos showed a protagonist watching a car moving from 
a garage on one end of the screen to the other garage at the other end. Following this, a chime 
signalled the two doors above each garage turning bright red for three seconds, serving as the 
anticipatory looking period. Then the protagonist came out of the door above the garage 
containing the car; the protagonist then grabbed the car. A “pass” was defined as the participants’ 
first look at the correct door (where the car is located). Other researchers who assessed 
anticipatory looking in toddlers and preschoolers also used first look as their dependent variable 
(Clements & Perner; 1994; Southgate et al., 2007). All participants included in this task passed at 
least one familiarization trial. The test trial also showed the protagonist watch the car move 
across the screen. However, a phone ring distracted the protagonist, preventing her from seeing 
the car backing up until it disappeared from the screen. Following the anticipatory period, the 
protagonist came out of the door above the garage where she had last seen the car. A “pass” was 
defined as the participants’ first look to the correct door (where the protagonist last saw the car). 
An attractive attention-getter (a green circle) paired with a ring was presented prior to each trial 










Figure 4. Four still screens depicting a test trial of the ToM task.  
Naïve physics. This task was adapted from Baron-Cohen and colleagues (1986). 
Participants were shown three cards depicting a story (e.g. girl is near a slide, girl goes up the 
ladder, girl goes down the slide). The first card of each training trial was placed on the story 
board and the participants were asked “what comes next?” – prompting them to place the two 
remaining cards in order on the story board. Participants received a point for each story that was 
placed in the correct order. All participants included in this task passed at least two training 
trials. Following this, the four test trials were administered in the same manner. The participants 
received a score out of four and a proportion of correct responses was calculated.   
 
Figure 5. An example of a sequence of images used in the naïve physics task.  
Naïve biology. This task was adapted from Gottfried and Gelman (2005). Participants 
were shown one of the training target image and two training “insides” (one depicting food and 
the other depicting clothing). The experimenter pointed to the white rectangle on the target 
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image and asked “which one goes here?”. The participants’ first response was coded, receiving a 
point if the food was placed on the fridge and if the clothing was placed on the dresser. All 
participants included in this task passed at least two training trials. Following this, the eight test 
trials were administered, where each target image was paired with one animal “inside” and one 
mechanical “inside”. Participants received a score out of eight on the test trials and a proportion 
of correct responses was calculated. 
 
 
Figure 6. An example of an animal target image and two possible “insides”.  
Coding. An experimenter blind to the hypothesis of the study coded the participants’ 
looking behaviour from the recorded videos for the biological motion, static face, and ToM 
tasks. A second experimenter coded 30% of the videos to establish reliability for each task. For 
each trial of the biological motion task, the experimenters coded duration of looking to each side 
of the screen. The Cohen kappa inter-rater reliability was 0.84. The primary experimenter 
calculated the total duration each participant looked at the human (social) and at the phase-
scrambled human (non-social). The proportion of looking at the human was calculated for each 
participant. For each trial of the static face task, the experimenters coded duration of looking to 
each side of the screen. The Cohen kappa inter-rater reliability was 0.92. The primary 
experimenter calculated the total duration each participant looked at the human (social) at the 
HAI and LAI objects (non-social). The proportion of looking at the human was calculated for 
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each participant. For each trial of the theory of mind task, the experimenters coded each look 
made to the right door and to the left door during the anticipatory looking period. The Cohen 
kappa inter-rater reliability was 0.82. The primary experimenter coded whether the first look 
during the anticipatory period was to the correct door.  
Results and Discussion 
Participants’ chronological age, non-verbal mental age, verbal mental age, and SCQ 
scores were normally distributed and there were no outliers. Using a z-score cut-off of 2.5, there 
was one outlier among participants’ performance on the biological motion task. This participant 
was excluded from the analyses. Following this exclusion, participants’ performance on this task 
was normally distributed. Participants’ performance on the static face task, ToM task, naïve 
physics, and naïve biology tasks were normally distributed and there were no outliers.  
Chance Analyses. Thirty-six participants were included for the biological motion task. 
On average, participants looked at the social stimuli longer than at the non-social stimuli (M = 
.53, SD = .09; t(35) = 2.18, p = .036, 95% CI [.002, .067], d = .363; see Figure 1). Thirty-three 
participants were included for the static face task. On average, participants also looked at the 
social stimuli longer than at the non-social stimuli (M = .55, SD = .09; t(32) = 3.32, p = .002, 
95% CI [.020, .083], d = .578; see Figure 1). Separate analyses were conducted for the social 
images paired with HAI objects and for the social images paired with the LAI objects. 
Participants looked longer at the social stimuli when it was paired with an LAI object (M = .59, 
SD = .11; t(32) = 5.02, p = .000, CI [.055, .130], d = .875; see Figure 2) but performed at chance 
when the social stimuli were paired with a HAI object (M = .52, SD = .09; t(32) = .96, p = .344, 
CI [-.018, .049], d = .168; see Figure 2). A total of 44% of the participants passed the ToM task. 
Since a pass/fail criterion is used for this task, a non-parametric binomial test was conducted; the 
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participants performed at chance on the ToM task (p = .618, d = -.110). Thirty-six participants 
were included for the naïve physics task. On average, participants performed well above chance 
(50%) on that task (M = .78, SD = .22, t(35) = 7.88, p = .000, CI [.211, .358], d = 1.314; see 
Figure 3). All participants were included for the naïve biology task. On average, participants also 
performed well above chance (50%) on that task (M = .81, SD = .20, t(39) = 9.90, p = .000, CI 
[.243, .368], d = 1.565; see Figure 3). There was no difference in performance on the naïve 
biology task and the naïve physics task, t(35) = -1.082, p = .287, CI [-.116, .035], d = -0.199. 
Correlational Analyses. The False Discovery Rate procedure suggested by Benjamini 
and Hochberg (1995) was used to correct for multiple comparisons. Non-verbal age equivalent 
was statistically significantly correlated with both naïve physics and naïve biology proportion of 
correct responses (see Table 2). Participants’ chronological age was also statistically 
significantly correlated with naïve physics and with naïve biology proportion of correct 
responses. These were the only tasks correlated with participants’ chronological age and non-
verbal age equivalents. Participants’ performance on the biological motion task was statistically 
significantly correlated with participants’ performance on the static face task. Participants’ 
performance on the biological motion task was also statistically significantly correlated with 
participants’ performance on the static face task when the social images were paired with the 
LAI object; it was not correlated with participants’ performance on the static face task when the 
social images were paired with the HAI object. Furthermore, participants’ performance on the 
naïve physics task was statistically significantly correlated with their performance on the naïve 
biology task. Participants’ SCQ scores were not correlated with their performance on any of the 
tasks. Moreover, participants’ performance on the ToM task was not correlated with their 






Zero-order correlations between measures for TD children in Experiment 1.  
 












DAS  1 .883* .054 -.283 -.039 -.037 -.046 .121 .350* .575* 
Age - 1 .153 -.158 .009 -.024 -.010 .097 .482* .557* 
SCQ  - - 1 -.069 .129 .124 .144 .065 -.195 -.069 
Bio. Motion  - - - 1 .209 .504* .449* -.050 .160 -.154 
Static HAI  - - - - 1 .521* .853* -.032 .151 .077 
Static LAI  - - - - - 1 .879* .296 -.027 -.227 
Static Total  - - - - - - 1 .145 .065 -.077 
ToM  - - - - - - - 1 .091 -.149 
Naïve Physics  - - - - - - - - 1 .396* 
Naïve Biology  - - - - - - - - - 1 
NOTE: * indicates that the correlation is significant after the false discovery rate procedure 
(Benjamini & Hochberg, 1995) was applied, where the adjusted alpha is less than .05.  
It was hypothesized that TD children’s performance on the two social motivation tasks 
would be positively associated with their performance on the ToM task, which measures a 
critical construct of naïve psychology. This hypothesis was not supported as the relation between 
results on the ToM task and the static face and biological motion tasks were not significant. In 
other words, TD children’s motivation to orient to social stimuli, whether static or dynamic in 
nature was not related to their ability to attribute a mental state, specifically a false belief, to a 
protagonist. It was also hypothesized that the TD children’s performance on the individual social 
motivation tasks would be positively related to each other. As expected, the link between the 
static face and the biological motion tasks was positive and moderate, indicating that individuals 
who show a social preference with static stimuli also show a social preference with dynamic 
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stimuli that are degraded, such as point-light displays. As expected, results from this group of TD 
children also indicate that TD children show a social preference on both types of stimuli (Figure 
7). Interestingly, TD children do not show this social preference when the social stimuli are 
paired with an object deemed highly salient to children with ASD (i.e. HAI object; Figure 8). 
Similar results were found by Sasson and colleagues (2011), who showed similar stimuli to TD 
children and children with ASD aged 2 to 5 years. These researchers did not assess social 
preference per se, but did measure children’s exploration and fixation patterns when viewing 
arrays of social and non-social stimuli (i.e., HAI and LAI objects). The researchers found that 
children with ASD explored more the HAI objects than the LAI objects, whereas the TD children 
seemed to explore the two types of objects equally (Sasson et al., 2011). The findings in the 
present study suggest that TD children might find the HAI images more salient than the LAI as 
well and that this attention to saliency might not be specific to children with ASD. In the 
literature, social preference is commonly studied using one type of social stimuli (e.g., static, 
dynamic, auditory, interactive). Given that these stimuli are seldom administered to the same 
participants, the present results provide further evidence that these tasks measure the same 
concept: social motivation. Furthermore, these results allow us to observe social motivation 
using different modalities; the biological motion task exhibits the motion typical of a social 
figure in a point-light display. The static face task exhibits a social stimulus made from 
naturalistic pictures of humans of various ages and ethnicities, which is a more ecologically-valid 
type of social stimuli. Thus, we can extend the understanding of children’s social motivation 








Figure 8. Mean proportion of looking time at the social stimuli on the static face task in HAI and 
LAI object conditions. 
 It was expected that TD children would pass the implicit false belief task. However, 








































































familiarization videos shown before the test video never leaves the scene. In the test video, the 
car leaves the scene in the absence of the protagonist’s knowledge. This ToM paradigm was 
designed by Thoermer and colleagues (2012), who reported that 55% of 18-month-olds passed 
the implicit false belief task. Southgate and colleagues (2007) also used a similar paradigm 
where the test object is removed from the scene during the test trial. In this study, 85% of 2-year-
old children correctly anticipated the protagonist’s actions. However, in this paradigm the test 
object is a ball that is removed from the scene by a puppet. This paradigm was also used with 
older children aged 6 to 8 years; 71% of the children passed this implicit false belief task. In the 
present study, the test object appears autonomous as it moves without external support and the 
children looked randomly to one of the two doors on the screen. Thus, it is possible that the 
children who failed the ToM task (first look to the side of the screen where the car disappeared) 
expected the car to come back to the scene. The toddlers in Thoermer and colleagues’ study 
(2012) were younger and may not have processed the video as the older children did in our 
study, which may explain why the success rate in our study is lower than in the aformentioned 
study. Future studies could include a familiarization video where the car leaves the scene to 
determine whether or not this novel action explains why TD children performed at chance on this 
task. Grosse Wiesmann, Friederici, Singer, and Steinbeis (in press) assessed implicit false belief 
in preschoolers aged 3- and 4-years-old. These researchers presented ten familiarization trials 
and 12 test trials. In this study, both the 3-year-old and the 4-year-old children performed 
significantly above chance on the implicit false belief task. It is possible that the reason why the 
TD children in the present study did not perform statistically significantly above chance is 
because they viewed only one trial. The reason only one trial was shown was to minimize the 
risk of fatigue since several tasks administered during their visit. 
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With regards to the naïve theories investigated in the present study, it was hypothesized 
that children’s performance on the ToM task would be correlated to their performance on the 
naïve physics and naïve biology tasks. Only the naïve physics and the naïve biology tasks were 
positively correlated with each other. Furthermore, TD children’s performance was not different 
on these two tasks. In other words, children who were able to complete the sequence of stories 
depicting physics concepts were equally able to match animal and mechanical “insides” to their 
target images. This hypothesis was exploratory in nature since to the best of our knowledge, the 
relation between these three domain-specific theories has not yet been assessed with a within-
subject design. Although naïve physics and naïve biology are domain-specific, the children were 
expected to infer the content of the stimuli (i.e., infer that lungs were “animal insides”). Thus, the 
children were expected to make inductive inferences across domains. Nevertheless, only the 
naïve physics and naïve biology tasks were found to be related. A possible explanation as to why 
our initial hypothesis was not supported is that both naïve physics and naïve biology involve 
reasoning, whereas naïve psychology is based more on social interactions and is related to 
mental state talk (Ruffman, 2014). Furthermore, the naïve psychology task measured anticipatory 
responses using a visual attention paradigm; results may differ if a standard task (such as an 
explicit false belief task) was used. In summary, children with good theory building abilities 
involving reasoning would perform well on the naïve physics and naïve biology tasks, but not 
necessarily on the naïve psychology task. In order to excel in all three naïve theories, both strong 
reasoning abilities and well established social-interaction knowledge is needed. Future studies 
could investigate this hypothesis by controlling for mental state talk between children and their 
caregivers. The naïve biology task was correlated with non-verbal mental age equivalent; 
suggesting that the understanding of biological “insides” has a developmental trajectory in TD 
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children. Parallel results were found by Gottfried and Gelman (2005), where the older children in 
their sample passed the naïve biology task, but the younger children struggled with the 
understanding of “insides”.  
 
Figure 9. Proportion of correct responses on the naïve theory tasks. 
Experiment 2 
Because social motivation theory posits that level of social motivation is associated with 
ToM abilities regardless of diagnosis, we expect this relation to be present in both TD children 
and children with ASD. TD children's performance was expected to be as in Experiment 1 but 
children with ASD were expected to fail the ToM task and to have deficits in social motivation. 
It was hypothesized that children with ASD would fail the naïve psychology task but not the 
naïve physics task since it has been shown that this population does not have deficits in this 
domain-specific area. With regard to naïve biology, one might expect no deficit as well. To the 
best of our knowledge, this study is the first to integrate social motivation theory and naïve 











































Participants. Participants were recruited from a hospital database, from specialized 
centers for children with ASD, and from provincial and municipal Autism organizations. The 
participants included in the study had previously received a primary diagnosis of ASD from 
licensed psychologists or pediatricians by satisfying diagnostic criteria on the Autism Diagnostic 
Observation Schedule (ADOS; Lord et al., 2000). Seventeen participants diagnosed with ASD 
aged 3 to 7 years participated in the study. One participant was excluded due to fussiness. The 
final ASD sample consisted of sixteen English- and French-speaking participants (16 boys; mean 
age = 5.22 years, range = 2.08–7.08). Participants were excluded in the analyses if the task was 
not recorded for the biological motion task (n = 1), static face (n = 1); none were excluded from 
the ToM task. The results of sixteen TD participants from experiment one were included in this 
experiment in order to serve as control group (8 boys and 8 girls; mean age = 3.98 years, range 
2.08–7.50). Thirteen participants spoke English and three spoke French. The TD and the ASD 
participants were matched on non-verbal mental age (see Table 3). All of these participants were 
included in the analyses since all of their tasks were recorded. 
Table 3 
Mean chronological age, non-verbal mental age, verbal mental age and social communication 





(age equivalent in years) 
PPVT-VMA  
(age equivalent in years) 
SCQ 
Scores 
TD Mean 3.98 4.28 4.72 4.13 
 SD  1.49 1.56 1.79 3.90 
 Range 2.08–7.50 2.58–7.42 1.83–7.42 0–11 
ASD Mean 5.22 4.36 4.06 16.67 
 SD  1.36 1.87 1.85 6.85 




Materials and Procedures. The materials, procedures, and coding were the same as in 
experiment one.  
Results and Discussion 
In both groups, participants’ chronological age, non-verbal mental age, verbal mental 
age, and SCQ scores were normally distributed and there were no outliers. In both groups, 
participants’ performance on the biological motion, static face task, ToM task, naïve physics, and 
naïve biology tasks were normally distributed and there were no outliers.  
Chance Analyses.  
TD group. All sixteen participants were included for the biological motion task. On 
average, participants looked at the social stimuli longer than at the non-social stimuli (M = .57, 
SD = .10; t(15) = 2.67, p = .017, 95% CI [.014, .120], d = .668). All participants were included 
for the static face task. On average, participants looked at the social stimuli longer than at the 
non-social stimuli (M = .56, SD = .10; t(15) = 2.29, p = .037, 95% CI [.004, .107], d = .573). 
Participants looked longer at the social stimuli when it was paired with an LAI object (M = .61, 
SD = .12; t(15) = 3.67, p = .002, CI [.045, .171], d = .917). Participants performed at chance 
when the social stimuli was paired with a HAI object (M = .51, SD = .09; t(15) = .25, p = .807, 
CI [-.044, .056], d = .062). A total of 63% of the participants passed the ToM task, a proportion 
not different than expected by chance (p = .454, d = .250). Fifteen participants were included for 
the naïve physics task. On average, participants performed well above chance on that task (M = 
.75, SD = .23, t(14) = 4.18, p = .001, CI [.122, .378], d = 1.080). All participants were included 
for the naïve biology task and they performed well above chance on that task (M = .78, SD = .23, 
t(15) = 4.83, p = .000, CI [.154, .397], d = 1.207). 
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ASD group. Fifteen participants were included for the biological motion task. 
Participants performed at chance; they looked equally long at the social and non-social stimuli 
(M = .53, SD = .16; t(14) = .791, p = .442, 95% CI [-.056, .121], d = .204). Fifteen participants 
were included for the static face task. Overall, participants performed at chance (M = .52, SD = 
.16; t(14) = .58, p = .569, 95% CI [-.066, .115], d = .151). Participants also performed at chance 
when the social stimuli was paired with a LAI object (M = .55, SD = .18; t(14) = .98, p = .344, 
CI [-.055, .146], d = .253) and when the social stimuli was paired with a HAI object (M = .51, 
SD = .18; t(14) = .18, p = .860, CI [-.089, .106], d = .046). A total of 31% of the 16 participants 
passed the ToM task; the participants performed at chance on the ToM task (p = .210, d = -.392). 
Fourteen participants were included for the naïve physics task. On average, participants 
performed well above chance on that task (M = .69, SD = .26, t(13) = 2.71, p = .018, CI [.039, 
.342], d = .724). Participants included for the naïve biology task (N=15) performed well above 
chance on that task (M = .68, SD = .27, t(14) = 2.54, p = .024, CI [.028, .327], d = .654). 
Correlational Analyses.  
TD group. Verbal mental age equivalent was statistically significantly correlated with 
naïve biology proportion of correct responses (see Table 4). This was the only task correlated 
with participants’ verbal and non-verbal age equivalents. Participants’ performance on the 
biological motion task was not correlated with participants’ performance on the static face task. 
Furthermore, participants’ performance on the naïve physics task was not statistically 
significantly correlated with their performance on the naïve biology task. As in experiment one, 
participants’ SCQ scores were not correlated with their performance on any of the tasks. 
Participants’ performance on the ToM task was not correlated with their performance on any of 




Zero-Order correlation between measures for TD children in Experiment 2.  
 












DAS  1 .896* .113 -.263 -.322 -.031 -.160 .315 .294 .603 
PPVT  - 1 .154 -.182 -.048 .022 .011 .049 .281 .695* 
SCQ  - - 1 .032 .198 .313 .303 .197 -.259 .080 
Bio. Motion  - - - 1 .121 .319 .315 -.219 .087 -.095 
Static HAI  - - - - 1 .539 .838* -.082 -.045 .167 
Static LAI  - - - - - 1 .902* .343 -.385 -.392 
Static Total  - - - - - - 1 .164 -.250 -.290 
ToM  - - - - - - - 1 .000 -.284 
Naïve Physics  - - - - - - - - 1 .364 
Naïve Biology  - - - - - - - - - 1 
NOTE: * indicates that the correlation is significant after the false discovery rate procedure 
(Benjamini & Hochberg, 1995) was applied, where the adjusted alpha is less than .05.  
ASD group. Non-verbal age equivalent was statistically significantly correlated with 
naïve physics proportion of correct responses and with naïve biology proportion of correct 
responses (see Table 5). Verbal mental age equivalent was only statistically significantly 
correlated with naïve physics proportion of correct responses. These were the only tasks 
correlated with participants’ verbal and non-verbal age equivalents. Participants’ performance on 
the biological motion task was not correlated with participants’ performance on the static face 
task. The correlation between participants’ performance on the naïve physics task and their 
performance on the naïve biology task was not statistically significant but it was trending (p 
=.063). In this group as well, participants’ SCQ scores were not correlated with their 
performance on any of the tasks. Participants’ performance on the ToM task was not correlated 





Correlational analyses between measures for children with ASD. 
 












DAS  1 .875* -.285 -.316 -.212 -.099 -.169 -.226 .723* .597* 
PPVT  - 1 -.252 -.242 .314 -.271 -.321 -.130 .686* .555 
SCQ  - - 1 .570* .089 -.092 -.008 -.285 -.436 -.389 
Bio. Motion  - - - 1 .165 -.218 -.041 -.139 -.235 -.607* 
Static HAI  - - - - 1 .686* .913* .180 -.485 -.564 
Static LAI  - - - - - 1 .922* -.112 -.299 -.261 
Static Total  - - - - - - 1 .042 -.429 -.436 
ToM  - - - - - - - 1 -.265 .067 
Naïve Physics  - - - - - - - - 1 .510 
Naïve Biology  - - - - - - - - - 1 
NOTE: * indicates that the correlation is significant after the false discovery rate procedure 
(Benjamini & Hochberg, 1995) was applied, where the adjusted alpha is less than .05. 
Between group comparisons. A repeated measures group (TD vs. ASD) X social 
motivation tasks (biological motion vs. static face) ANOVA was conducted. There were no main 
effects or interaction found; both groups performed equally on both social motivation tasks (see 
Figure 4). A repeated measures group (TD vs. ASD) X static face group (HAI vs. LAI) ANOVA 
was conducted. A main effect of static face group was found, f(29) = 9.92, p = .004, d = .255. 
Post-hoc paired samples t-test were conducted; both groups looked longer at the social stimuli 
when it was paired with an LAI object, t(30) = -3140, p = .004, d = .488 (see Figure 5). A 
repeated measures group (TD vs. ASD) X naïve theory tasks (naïve physics vs. naïve biology) 
ANOVA was conducted. There were no main effects or interaction found; both groups 
performed equally on both naïve theory tasks (see Figure 6). A group (TD vs. ASD) X ToM 
(pass vs. fail) was conducted to determine whether both groups performed differently on the 
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ToM task. The chi-square was not statistically significant but, as expected, there was trend for 
TD children to perform better (χ2 = 3.14, p = .077, V = .313). 
It was hypothesized that a relation between the two social motivation tasks and the ToM 
task would be observed for the ASD group. The relation between the social motivation tasks and 
the ToM task was not significant in the ASD group, suggesting that children with ASD’s deficits 
in social orienting were not associated with poorer performance on the false belief task. As in 
Experiment 1, the correlations between these variables were not significant in the TD group as 
well. Nevertheless, there was little variability in the ToM task because it is a measure with a 
pass/fail outcome. Thus, the lack of correlations may be due to this lack of variability. 
In Experiment 2, the relation between the two social motivation tasks in the TD group 
was not significant (R2 = 0.10). This is probably due to a lack of power; Experiment 1 showed 
that the effect was significant with a larger sample size (R2 = 0.20). There was no relation 
between the two social motivation tasks in the ASD group as well (R2 = 0.002). The TD children 
in this experiment showed a similar pattern of social preference as in Experiment 1 (Figure 10). 
When TD children’s performance was compared to the ASD children’s performance on the 
biological motion task, no statistically significant between-group differences were found. 
Nevertheless, TD children showed a social preference on the biological motion task and, as 
expected, children with ASD did not show such social preference. There were no statistically 
significant between-group differences on the static face task. Yet, TD children preferred to orient 
to the social stimuli, whereas children with ASD did not show a social preference on that task as 
well. Furthermore, TD children preferred to orient to the social stimuli unless it was paired with 
an HAI object, indicating that these objects are salient for all children (Figure 11). Interestingly, 
both groups looked longer at the social stimuli if they were paired with LAI objects. This 
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indicates that the HAI objects reduced children’s social motivation regardless of 
symptomatology. The ASD group findings corroborate results found by Sasson and colleagues 
(2008; 2011), where the children with ASD looked less at the social images if the arrays of 
images presented contained HAI images. Taken together, this suggests that when there are other 
salient images present, children with ASD are less motivated to look at the social stimuli. As 
discussed above, this is also true for TD children. Nevertheless, the difference between the two 
group findings is that TD children displayed an overall social preference, whereas the children 
with ASD did not. Chevallier and colleagues (2015) discussed types of stimuli used in social 
preference paradigms in ASD research. They discussed the importance of using ecologically 
valid stimuli that are dynamic and interactive in nature in order to better capture one’s social 
motivation. It is possible that the stimuli used in this study were not ecologically-valid enough to 
detect the differences in social motivation between TD children and children with ASD 
(between-group analyses). In Experiment 2, 63% of the subsample of TD children passed the 
implicit false belief task. This was not statistically significantly above chance and this is 
consistent with TD children’s performance in the first experiment. In contrast, only 31% of the 
children with ASD passed this task; the difference between the TD children and the children with 
ASD on the implicit false belief task was a statistical trend. This suggests that despite the fact 
that TD children are performing at chance level, children with ASD tend to perform worse than 




Figure 10. Proportion of looking time at the social stimuli on the social motivation tasks for TD 
children and children with ASD. 
 
Figure 11. Proportion of looking at the social stimuli on the static face task when the social 
stimuli is paired with an HAI object and when it is paired with a LAI object for TD children and 
children with ASD.  
Taken together, the ToM results are difficult to put into perspective with regards to 
previous research given that the TD group did not perform as expected. It is possible that 











































































atypical results. Past studies using anticipatory looking to measure implicit false belief in young 
children have varied  in success rate; key studies reported that between 55 and 85% of the 
participants correctly anticipated the protagonist’s actions (Senju, et al., 2012; Southgate et al., 
2007; Thoermer et al., 2012). Therefore, not all TD children will pass the implicit false belief 
task and this variability is typical in ToM research. The current findings show that children with 
ASD tended to perform worse than the TD children on the same task, indicating a deficit in ToM 
despite the difficulty involved in the task. This is in line with previous research on implicit or 
anticipatory false belief in children with ASD (Baron-Cohen et al., 1986; Kimhi, 2014; Senju, 
2012; Slaughter, 2015). Some researchers have even found this to be true in adults with ASD, 
where the participants failed to spontaneously anticipate the protagonist’s actions in a false belief 
task (Senju et al., 2009). For example, Schuwerk, Vuori, and Sodian (2015) demonstrated that 
adults diagnosed with ASD can pass some explicit false belief tasks, but they performed 
significantly worse than TDs on the implicit false belief tasks. In other words, the implicit and 
spontaneous attribution of mental states to others remains impaired in individuals with ASD 
from childhood to adulthood. They do perform better on the explicit version of the tasks, which 
is arguably due to compensations these individuals learn over the years (Frith, 2012; Senju, 
2012). 
Another hypothesis tested in the present study was that children would fail the naïve 
psychology task but succeed on the naïve physics or biology tasks. As discussed above, children 
with ASD did not perform better than chance on the naïve psychology task. In addition, ASD 
children’s performance on the other two naïve theory tasks did not differ from TD children’s 
performance. Thus, as expected, naïve physics and naïve biology appear to be developed to the 
same extent in both children with ASD and TD children; both groups had between 67% and 78% 
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correct responses on both tasks (Figure 12). Although the relation between non-verbal mental 
age and the naïve theory tasks was not statistically significant in the TD group, the relations were 
statistically significant in the ASD group. This suggests that these two tasks have a 
developmental trajectory in this population. These results support the hypothesis that children 
with ASD have a specific impairment in naïve psychology (theory of mind) but not in other 
naïve theories, as was previously suggested by various researchers (Baron-Cohen et al., 1986; 
Peterson & Siegal, 1997). 
 
 
Figure 12. Proportion of correct responses on the naïve theory tasks for TD children and children 
with ASD.  
General Discussion 
One of the goals of this study was to explore the relations between the social motivation 
tasks. To the best of our knowledge, this is the first time that a study compares the performance 
of both TD children and children with ASD on these two tasks to determine whether their social 
orienting is consistent across modalities. Results from Experiment 1 support the hypothesis that 














































tasks were correlated with each other. This relation was not present in Experiment 2 when 
children with ASD viewed the same stimuli, indicating that children with ASD do not respond 
consistently is social orienting paradigms. This is of importance because only one type of social 
stimuli is typically used in social orienting studies. Children with ASD’s performance on a 
dynamic stimuli will not necessarily be the same as their performance on a static stimuli; this is 
important to note when making conclusions about children with ASD’s social orienting 
behaviour. Furthermore, Experiment 1 served to reflect the extent to which TD children aged 3 
to 6 years orient to social stimuli. This effect is robust since TD children showed a social 
preference on two types of modalities (i.e. static and dynamic stimuli). However, their social 
preference, when viewing static images, disappears when the social element is paired with a type 
of object previously categorized as HAI. Previous research has argued that children with ASD 
orient more to these objects because they are part of their circumscribed interests (Sasson et al., 
2008; 2011). However, our results suggest that both TD and children with ASD prefer these 
objects to LAI objects. Thus, it can be argued that past (and present) results where children with 
ASD’s lower attention to social stimuli when paired to these HAI objects might be partially 
driven by saliency. We therefore encourage future studies to control for saliency when 
comparing HAI and LAI objects.  Children with ASD, as a group, did not show a social 
preference on either the biological motion of the static face tasks. This indicates that, 
notwithstanding individual variabilities across tasks, children with ASD may have deficits in 
social motivation.  
Another goal to this study was to examine the relation between social motivation and 
socio-cognitive abilities in TD children and children with ASD. The purpose of this was to 
explore the social motivation theory in young children with ASD in order to better understand 
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how this population’s core symptomatology is related to well-known socio-cognitive deficits. In 
both the group comprised of TD children and the group of children with ASD, the tasks 
assessing social motivation were not related to the ToM task. At first glance, this lack of 
association does not lend support to the social motivation theory. This theory posits that the 
motivation to orient to social stimuli provides individuals with the opportunity to learn from said 
social stimuli, thus enabling the individual’s socio-cognitive abilities to develop. Regardless of 
which concept (i.e. social motivation and ToM) causes the other, both abilities should be 
associated with each other. As previously mentioned, this could be due to the ToM task being 
based on a single trial. It is also important to note that the social motivation theory was proposed 
in order to explain ASD symptomatology so it is possible the association is difficult to capture in 
TD children given their lack of social and communication deficits. When it was assessed in the 
ASD group, it is possible that the effect was not found due to lack of power.  
  The third goal of the present study was to extend the work on the dissociation across 
naïve theories among children with ASD. Although it cannot be concluded that the TD children 
in this study passed the ToM task, children with ASD tended to perform worse than the TDs on 
this task, which is consistent with the past literature (Senju, 2012). Indeed, children with ASD’s 
difficulties on ToM tasks are well documented. Yet it is still a perplexing phenomenon given the 
amount of variability in their abilities depending on the format in which the task is administered. 
Nevertheless, given individuals with ASD’s overall poorer performance in ToM tasks, some 
theoretical perspectives suggest that this population has core deficits in naïve psychology. Baron-
Cohen and colleagues (1986) proposed these core deficits after finding that their participants 
with ASD failed the naïve psychology task but not the naïve physics task. Results from the 
current study corroborate these findings. In addition, we extended previous research in showing 
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that ASD children are also competent in naïve biology. In fact, to our knowledge this is the first 
study to examine all three naïve theories in the same population of children with ASD and 
compare them to matched controls. The TD children performed equally well on the naïve physics 
and naïve biology tasks but their performance on the ToM task was not statistically significantly 
above 50% (the criterion for passing the task). As previously discussed, this might be because 
ToM abilities are often related to mental state talk in the home (Ruffman, 2014). TD children 
findings might differ if mental state talk was controlled for in the analysis or if a standard 
explicit false belief task was used. Both groups had consistent performances on the naïve physics 
and naïve biology tasks; this partially supports the idea that children who are good at theory 
building would be able to do well across naïve theories. The differences arise when social and 
communication related skills are involved, such as in an implicit false-belief task. This 
discrepancy is of importance because it illustrates that children with ASD develop naïve theories 
and can be skilled at theory building; their core deficits stem from their social and 
communication symptomatology.  
 This study has both several strengths and limitations. Some of the limitations include 
small sample sizes, and the methodological aspects of the ToM task that might be responsible for 
the atypical performance of the TD children. When using implicit false belief tasks in 
preschoolers, their level of reasoning abilities should be taken into account, which may not be as 
relevant when studying infants. We suspect that the children might have taken a step further and 
expected the car to return in test trial. Future studies could include additional familiarization 
videos that show the children that when the car leaves the scene it does not in fact return.  
 An important strength of  this study is its attempt to integrate a number of variables in 
order to fully capture the concept of social motivation. For example, rather than studying social 
37 
 
motivation in isolation, this study included a ToM task along with two social orienting tasks in 
order to directly test the social motivation theory. Furthermore, rather than looking solely at 
children with ASD’s core deficits in naïve psychology, other naïve theories were included to get 
a detailed understanding of the role of various domain-specific knowledge tasks in both groups. 
The authors also recognize the value of replication in research. The current study either included 
several tasks used in previous studies or adapted previously used methodologies in order to 
extend on the existing literature. Results in the present study replicate and extend previous 
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